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Casenote

Kansas v. Marsh: A Thumb on the Scale of
Death?
In Kansas v. Marsh,1 the United States Supreme Court held that it
is not unconstitutional for a state's death penalty statute to require a
death sentence when a sentencing jury finds aggravating and mitigating
factors to be in equipoise.2 Extending its previous decision in Walton
v. Arizona,3 the Court explicitly determined that this type of sentencing5
4
met the requirements of Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia,
holding that no other constraint is imposed by the Constitution.' While
the repercussions of this decision may not be widely felt, they do indicate
the direction the Court is heading in death penalty jurisprudence.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Michael Lee Marsh II wanted to take a trip to Alaska. In order to
obtain the money for the trip, Marsh devised a plan to hold his friend

1. 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
2.

Id. at 2520.

3. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2522, 2524.
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Eric Pusch's wife, Marry, and child, M.P., captive, threatening to hurt
them unless Pusch gave Marsh the money. However, Marry arrived
home with her nineteen-month-old baby girl earlier than Marsh had
expected, and in a panic, he shot Marry several times, stabbed her, and
slashed her throat. Marsh then set fire to the Pusch home, using an
accelerant on Marry's body to start the fire. M.P. died in the fire. When
the police questioned Marsh, he confessed to killing Marry, but
alternately admitted and denied setting the fire. 7
Marsh was charged with capital murder of M.P., first-degree murder
of Marry, aggravated arson, and aggravated burglary.'
The jury
convicted Marsh, finding three statutory aggravating factors to support
a death sentence: "(1) Marsh knowingly or purposely killed or created
a great risk of death to more than one person; (2) he committed the
crime in order to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3)
he committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner."9 The jury further found that no mitigating factors existed to
outweigh the aggravating factors and unanimously voted to impose the
death penalty on Marsh. The trial judge found sufficient evidence to
support the sentence. Marsh was also sentenced to eighty-five months
imprisonment for his other crimes. 10
Marsh appealed his sentence directly to the Kansas Supreme Court,
facially challenging the wording of Kansas's death penalty statute,
Kansas Statutes Annotated section 21-4624(e)," that called for a death
sentence when aggravating factors and mitigating factors are found by
a jury to be in equipoise:
If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in KS.A. 214625 . . . exist[s] and, further, that the existence of such aggravating
circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which
are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to death; otherwise
the defendant shall be sentenced [as provided by law].12
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Marsh's argument that the
statute created an unconstitutional presumption in favor of death
because of its requirement of death when the aggravating and mitigating
factors are equal. 3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiora-

7.
8.

State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 452-53 (Kan. 2004).
Id. at 453.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11.
12.
13.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(e) (1995).
Id. (emphasis added).
Marsh, 102 P.3d at 458.
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ri to consider whether the requirement
of the Kansas death penalty
4
unconstitutional.1
was
statute
II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Modern Era of CapitalPunishment

The way capital punishment is administered in this country was
forever changed in 1972 when the Supreme Court decided Furman v.
Georgia,5 abolishing the death penalty as it was currently being
applied. The Court held the application of the death penalty to be "cruel
and unusual" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
The Court's main issue with the death penalty was its arbitrary
application, allowed by broad jury discretion. Justice Stewart, in his
the death penalty as
concurring opinion, went so far as to describe
"wantonly and... freakishly imposed."17
After Furman was decided, the states bustled to enact death penalty
legislation that would satisfy the Supreme Court's qualms. In Gregg v.
Georgia,'8 in 1976, the Court allowed the states to reinstate the death
9
penalty with new, less arbitrary statutes.' The Court rejected the
notion that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se because there
are real goals that capital punishment serves: retribution and deterrence, and the reason the death penalty was abolished in Furman, its
2°
The Georgia statute that
arbitrary application, could be remedied.
concerns of Furman by
the
remedied
Gregg
in
the Court approved
providing for bifurcated proceedings, in which guilt and sentencing
would be decided separately by a jury.2 ' The statute also narrowed the
class of defendants that was eligible for the death penalty by creating
aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury to
22
exist before the death penalty can be considered as a punishment.
The statute therefore sufficiently limited the jury's discretion in
imposing a death sentence.23

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2521.
408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 165-66.
See id. at 207.
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24
Decided the same day as Gregg, Woodson v. North Carolina
established another requirement in the new application of the death
penalty. North Carolina tried to cope with the Court's aversion to the
arbitrary application of the death penalty by making the death penalty
mandatory for first-degree murder, thus eliminating jury discretion
altogether.2 5 The Court held that this was not an appropriate way of
dealing with the constitutional violations that arise from too much jury
discretion.2 6 Juries must be guided in wielding their discretion, an
issue that mandatory death penalty statutes neither address nor
remedy. 7 Finally, and most pertinent to the present case, Woodson
held the North Carolina statute unconstitutional on the basis that it did
not allow for an individualized determination for each defendant facing
the death penalty. 28 In essence, juries must consider any mitigating
evidence of the circumstances of the offense and the character of the
offender.2 9 The Court came to this conclusion on the basis that "death
is ... different" from any other punishment that may be imposed,
therefore an individualized determination is necessary to ensure that
death is appropriate in each case in which it may be imposed.3 °

B.

MitigatingFactors

In 1978 in Lockett v. Ohio,3 a plurality of the Supreme Court held
that under no circumstances may a jury be precluded from considering
any relevant mitigating evidence.3 2 The plurality defined relevant
mitigating evidence as those "aspect[s] of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 3 The plurality cited
its "death is different" philosophy in allowing so much latitude to capital
defendants in presenting their cases at the sentencing phase. 34 The
plurality reversed the defendant's death sentence because the sentencer
was only allowed. to consider three statutory mitigating factors in
determining the sentence.3 5 The plurality was unwilling to take the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 589.
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risk that defendants may be executed where evidence exists that may
justify a more lenient sentence."6
The plurality's approach was
accepted by a majority of the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma,3 7 four
years later.3" Further, the Court held that the sentencer must not only
be able to consider mitigating evidence but must actually consider the
evidence.3 9
In 1983 in Zant v. Stephens, ° the Court determined that some
procedures must be left up to the states.4 ' Death penalty statutes must
narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty and allow
each defendant an individualized determination based on the defendant's
character and the circumstances of the crime.42 As long as a state's
statute allows for the jury's individualized determination of a defendant's case, a state does not have to outline a specific procedure for
weighing aggravating evidence against mitigating evidence.43
The
Court upheld the defendant's death sentence partly on the grounds that
all mitigating factors were considered by the jury in imposing the sentence."
C.

Weighing Statutes

As long as the death-eligible class of offenders is narrow and the jury
is able to make an individualized determination of the defendant, states
are authorized to structure their death penalty statutes in a variety of
ways. One way of structuring a statute is to mandate the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania,45 the
Court held that the defendant did get an individualized determination.'
The defendant challenged the Pennsylvania statute that
required imposition of the death penalty if the jury found that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors.47 The Court held that the
statute was not a mandatory death penalty statute barred by Woodson
because before imposing the death penalty, the statute first required a
jury determination that the aggravating factors outweighed the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 605.
455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Id. at 117.
Id. at 114-15.
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
See id. at 879-80.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 884-85, 891.
Id. at 891.
494 U.S. 299 (1990).
Id. at 305, 307-08.
Id. at 306.
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mitigating factors.'
If the jury determined that the aggravating
factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors, there would be no death
sentence. 49 The jury found one aggravating factor against the defendant and no mitigating factors. The aggravating factor narrowed the
defendant into the class of those eligible for the death penalty, and the
jury's instruction to consider "any 'matter concerning the character or
record of the defendant, or the circumstances of his offense'" was
sufficient to give him an individualized determination."
5
In the same term, the Court decided Boyde v. California,
similarly
holding that it was enough that the jury be instructed to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence to satisfy a defendant's right to an
individualized determination. 2 In Boyde the defendant did proffer
mitigating evidence on his own behalf, unlike in Blystone, but the Court
allowed the jury's determination that Boyde's mitigating evidence did
not outweigh the aggravating evidence against him. 3 The Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the Constitution requires juries
to be allowed to recommend a lesser sentence even when it finds
aggravation outweighs mitigation.54
Although many states have
statutes that allow such discretion, the Court held that there is no
requirement of "unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury.""5 The
Court once again placed discretionary decisions like this in the hands of
6
the state legislatures.
In yet another case from the 1990 term, Walton v. Arizona,57 the
Court continued its examination of statutes challenged as creating a
presumption that death is the proper sentence. The Arizona statute
provided that the court "shall" impose the death penalty if aggravating
circumstances are found, and mitigating factors are found insufficient to
call for leniency.55
In conclusory language, the Court pointed to
Blystone and Boyde as precedent that precluded holding Arizona's
sentencing statute unconstitutional. 9 The Court concluded that the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
(2002).
58.
59.

Id. at 305.
Id. at 305, 307.
Id. at 307-08.
494 U.S. 370 (1990).
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-703(E) (1989).

Walton, 497 U.S. at 651.
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Arizona statute was no different from those in Blystone and Boyde,
though not explaining why or how.' The Court continued this handsoff policy recently in Kansas v. Marsh.
III.

CouR's RATIONALE

In Kansas v. Marsh, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether a statute that imposes the death penalty where aggravating
and mitigating factors weigh equally is constitutional. 6 ' The Court
concluded that it is constitutional.6 2
A.

The Majority
Justice Thomas's majority opinion concentrated on three main points
in support of its holding: (1) that stare decisis directs the holding, citing
Walton v. Arizona; (2) that the Kansas statute adheres to Furman v.
Georgia64 and Gregg v. Georgia65 by narrowing the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty, and also allowing the jury to consider all
mitigating evidence, adhering to Lockett v. Ohio;" and (3) discounts the
dissent's assertion of DNA's important role in exonerating defendants
who were sentenced to death in doubtful cases.67
The Court began its analysis by pointing out that this case is
controlled by the Court's previous holding in Walton.68 The Court cited
its reasoning from Blystone v. Pennsylvania6' and Boyde v. California,7 ° that a statute that allows a jury to consider any mitigating
evidence meets constitutional bounds.7 The Court denied that the
question posed here was not also before the Court in Walton, stating
that a failure to explicitly discuss times of "equipoise" in Walton is not
enough to distinguish the two cases.72 The Court further cited the
dissent in Walton for support that the same issue had been previously
before the Court, therefore, the majority in Walton must be followed.73

60. Id. at 652.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

126 S. Ct. 2516, 2520.(2006).
Id.
497 U.S. 639 (1990).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
438 U.S. 536 (1978).
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2520-29.
Id. at 2522.
494 U.S. 299 (1990).
494 U.S. 370 (1990).
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id.
Id.
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Further, the Court compared the Arizona statute from Walton and the
Kansas statute at issue here.74 The Court pointed out that both
statutes have "been consistently construed to mean that the death
penalty will be imposed upon a finding that aggravating circumstances
are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances."7 5 Finally, the Court
noted that the Kansas statute is more lenient than the Arizona statute
previously held constitutional, at least in the allocation of burdens.7 6
The Arizona statute allocated the defendant the burden of proving
mitigating evidence sufficient to overcome any aggravating factors
proven by the state, while the Kansas statute requires the state to
overcome any mitigating factors produced by the defendant."
Second, the Court held that even without following Walton, the
Constitution does not require holding the Kansas statute unconstitutional.78 The Court held that the statute meets previously held requirements of the Eighth Amendment as described Furman, Gregg, and
Lockett. 9 According to the Court, the first requirement that a statute
must narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty was
indisputably met; the use of statutory aggravating factors achieves
this.80 The second requirement that relevant mitigating evidence be
admitted and considered by the jury was the requirement at issue here.
The Court pointed out that there is no constitutional requirement for
how juries must weigh mitigating evidence.8 ' Citing Boyde, the Court
noted that mandatory language of a statute does not preclude a jury
from considering all of the relevant mitigating evidence.82
The Court rejected Marsh's argument that the Kansas statute creates
a presumption in favor of imposing death. The Court stated that the
statute actually presumes that death is not the appropriate punishment
because the state has the burden of proving first, the existence of
aggravating factors to make the defendant eligible for death, and second,

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 2524.
Id.
Id.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2524-25.
80. Id. at 2525-26.
81. Id. at 2525 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality
opinion citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 875-76)).
82. Id. at 2427.

83.

Id.
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that any mitigating factors do not outweigh those aggravating factors.84
If the state fails to meet its burden, death cannot be imposed.8 5
The Court refused to accept Marsh's argument that juries may use a
determination that aggravating and mitigating factors are equally
balanced in order to avoid making a decision explicitly for or against a
death sentence in doubtful cases.8" The Court held that there can be
no confusion because the Kansas jury instructions clearly inform the jury
that a vote that factors are in equipoise is a vote for the imposition of
the death penalty." The Court followed the presumption that juries
listen to and follow instructions.88
Finally, the Court rejected the dissent's consideration of DNA
exoneration of people on death row.89 The majority held that any
reflection on this issue was irrelevant to the constitutionality of Kansas's
sentencing statute. ° The majority rejected the dissent's view that the
DNA issue should establish a rule making it harder to impose the death
penalty in all cases.9 1 The majority accepted that the death penalty is
not imposed perfectly in this country, stating that precedent allows
capital punishment even when not imposed flawlessly.92
B.

Justice Stevens's Dissent

Writing his own dissent, Justice Stevens began by pointing out the
problem with the majority following Walton v. Arizona as precedent.9 3
Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Walton and
asserted in this case that it is consistent to also dissent.9 4 According
to Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun bemoaned the plurality's opinion
in Walton because he saw the consequences of their actions more clearly
than the plurality.95 The plurality in Walton would not conclude that
Arizona's statute required imposition of the death penalty where
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are equally balanced;
therefore, the majority here could not depend on the plurality.9" Next,

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2528.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Stevens questioned the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
this case because the decision will not directly affect any state except
Kansas.97 Justice Stevens cited the Court's decision in California v.
Ramos," in which the Court declined to overrule the California
Supreme Court on a standard jury instruction regarding the Governor's
authority to commute life sentences because "'the wisdom of the decision
to permit juror consideration of possible commutation is best left to the
States.'"99 Finally, Justice Stevens pointed out that prior to Michigan
v. Long,"° the Court rarely reviewed criminal cases in which states set
aside the rulings of their own courts; Justice Stevens hoped to return to
that mentality.'"'
C.

Justice Souter's Dissent

Justice Souter also dissented, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. First, Justice Souter believed the
imposition of the death penalty in situations where aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are in equipoise would only occur in doubtful
cases, and he believed that to be unconstitutional.'
Justice Souter
agreed with Justice Stevens that stare decisis does not control this case
and that Justice Blackmun's dissent in Walton v. Arizona
was concerned
0 3
with more than the plurality was willing to hold.
Justice Souter took serious exception to the majority's holding that as
long as a jury considers any mitigating evidence, an individualized
determination is made and the sentence is constitutional."° Justice
Souter agreed that states have discretion in planning their sentencing
systems but asserted that each system "must meet an ultimate test of
constitutional reliability in producing 'a reasoned moral response to the
defendant's background, character, and crime.'"'
Therefore, a
sentencing system must "produce morally justifiable results.""°
Justice Souter criticized both the majority and the Walton plurality for
simply equating Pennsylvania's and California's statutes in Blystone and

97. Id. at 2539-40.
98. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
99. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Ramos, 463 U.S. at
1014).
100. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
101. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2541 n.1.
104. Id. at 2544.
105. Id. at 2542 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)), abrogated by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
106. Id.

2007]

KANSAS V. MARSH

1457

Boyde with that of Arizona and Kansas. 11 7 The difference, Justice
Souter noted, is that Pennsylvania and California imposed death where
the aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors; therefore, in
8
equipoise, Pennsylvania and California would impose life sentences.1
According to Justice Souter, the majority's decision required less than a
death sentence that is directly related to the individual defendant and
circumstances of the crime as Penry requires."1 9 Further, Justice
Souter asserted that this decision places a "thumb on death's side of the
scale."" 0 The death penalty will no longer be reserved for the "worst
of the worst," those who are the most culpable."'
Finally, Justice Souter cited to studies and articles that declare that
the death penalty system in the United States has failed by sentencing
innocent people to death.112 Justice Souter pointed to Illinois's moratorium on executions in 2000, imposed after thirteen people on death row
were shown to be innocent."' Justice Souter admitted that it is early
to criticize capital sentencing in this country, but the Court's policy that
"death is different" should encourage the Court to be cautious in this
case in upholding a tie-breaker that favors death." 4
D.

The Concurrence: An Answer to the Dissents
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion attacked the dissenting opinions on
two points: (1) that the Supreme Court rightly accepted certiorari in this
case and (2) that the dissent does not present evidence of any case where
an innocent person was executed." 5
First, Justice Scalia pointed out that if the Supreme Court refused to
grant certiorari in all cases where the State is the petitioner, the Court
would never review state courts' interpretations of federal law, and the
Court's current docket would be greatly reduced."'
Next, Justice
Scalia rejected the dissenters' argument that the Constitution only gave
the Court the authority to hear cases that reject the "assertion of
governing federal law" by stating that much of the Court's power was

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2542-43 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 319).
110. Id. (quoting Socher v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992)).
111. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
112. Id. at 2544-45.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2545-46.
115. Id. at 2539-49 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2530.
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not originally authorized by the Constitution.'1 7 Finally, Justice Scalia
stated that the Court did have the authority to grant certiorari in this
case because the Supreme Court has the authority to correct states'
118
erroneous interpretations of federal law, especially the Constitution.
Second, Justice Scalia took issue with Justice Souter's dissent and his
assertion concerning DNA exonerations. Justice Scalia stated that DNA
exoneration is an irrelevant issue because in this case, Marsh had
already been convicted, so questions about his innocence have been
disposed with." 9 Justice Scalia pointed out that there is not a single
case "in which it is clear that a person was executed for a crime he did
not commit." 2 ° Justice Scalia attacked the 1987 article cited by the
dissent, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 2' criticizing it as obsolete because it examined only old executions, the most
recent being in 1984, 1964, and 1951.122 Justice Scalia claimed the
study's conclusions were unconfirmed and pointed out that even the
authors of the 1987 study admitted that."2 Justice Scalia hailed the
criminal justice system as the reason that exonerated defendants have
been released from death row, stating that it was the system that found
them innocent or exonerated. 124 He also pointed out that "exoneration"
does not equate to innocence, insinuating that exonerated people who are
not proven innocent do not deserve to be released. 12 After discussing
several individual cases highlighting the horrifying circumstances of the
murders, Justice Scalia asserted that the 1margin
for error in executing
26
is "reduced to an insignificant minimum."
WY. IMPLICATIONS

There are four implications that are initiated by Kansas v. Marsh.
First, the decision illustrates the Court's current unwillingness to second
guess state death penalty policies that meet the minimum FurmanGregg standards. As this is among the first death penalty cases heard
by the Court including the newest members, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, it marks the tone the Court will likely take in the future.

117. Id. at 2530 n.1.
118. Id. at 2531.
119. Id. at 2532.
120. Id. at 2533.
121. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
122. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2534 (Scalia J., concurring).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2535-36.
125. See id. at 2538-39.
126. Id. at 2539.
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The Chief Justice seat has probably not changed very much. Chief
Justice Roberts's conservative voting record as a member of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia shows that he will likely vote
similarly to Chief Justice Rehnquist in upholding state death penalty
practices. On the other hand, Justice Alito, replacing Justice O'Connor,
one of the swing votes on the previous court, does not seem as likely to
"fine-tune state procedures" as Justice O'Connor was, according to Kent
Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. 27 For example,
in Richmond v. Lewis,128 Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority,
reversing the Arizona Supreme Court's decision to uphold the defendant's death sentence where state appellate judges did not reweigh
remaining factors after an invalidation of an unconstitutionally vague
aggravating factor.129
However, Justice O'Connor often voted to
uphold state capital punishment policies. Justice Alito is expected to
continue his practice from his position on the Court of Appeals for the
Third District of upholding the death penalty. 3 '
Second, this decision shows a growing gap in how the death penalty
is applied across the nation. There is already a disparity in the
dispensation of capital sentences between weighing states and nonweighing states, where juries are authorized to be lenient for any reason.
Allowing Kansas's unique statute to stand, the Court has blessed death
sentences that will occur in equipoise cases in Kansas but not in other
states. Therefore, a defendant's likelihood of receiving the death penalty
depends on where he commits the crime. Critics of the death penalty
will continue to point out that allowing the states great latitude in
administering the death penalty will lead to greater arbitrariness in the
process. Too much arbitrariness will lead to Eighth Amendment
violations.
Third, as Justice Souter points out in his dissent, the Court has
sanctioned a sentencing scheme that will allow and even increase the
likelihood of a death sentence for offenders who are not the "worst of the
worst." This decision could signal to state legislatures that an individualized determination to separate offenders who are most culpable is no
longer required. Kansas's sentencing structure permits legislatures to

127. Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court 2005-2006Term Review: DeathPenaltyDisquiet
Echoes EarlierTime: Supreme CourtIssues Batch of Conflicting Decisions,185 N.J.L.J. 287
(2006); see Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
128. 506 U.S. 40 (1992).
129. Id. at 52.
130. See Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 1995) (Justice Alito writing for the
court, upholding death sentence even where an aggravating factor was held invalid by
declaring Delaware's statute non-weighing).
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get around the requirement outlined in Roper v. Simmons.13 ' Roper
explained that reserving the death penalty for the most culpable is
necessary in order to ensure that the field of death-eligible offenders is
sufficiently narrowed and adequately applied based on each offender's
individual characteristics. 132
Without sufficient controls, we risk
"placing a thumb on death's side of the scale.""
Finally, Justice Souter's dissent, and even Justice Scalia's concurrence,
signal a move toward giving DNA exoneration a more serious look. DNA
has revolutionized the criminal justice system, allowing arguably
undeniable proof of guilt or innocence in many cases. Innocence projects
and foundations are being founded that are devoted to exonerating
erroneously convicted individuals. Justice Souter's dissent and Justice
Scalia's vehement concurrence respond to a shift in American attitudes,
requiring more scientific, concrete evidence before convicting people, let
alone sentencing them to death.
The concurrence and dissent in this case responded to an ongoing
debate regarding DNA exoneration. This has been an issue for some
time, and it has finally been addressed by the Court. In the winter of
2005, the Northwestern University School of Law held an entire
symposium dedicated to innocence in capital sentencing. Advocates for
both sides of the debate contributed. Samuel Gross, a law professor at
the University of Michigan, argued that after having found 340 criminal
defendants exonerated between 1989 and 2003, it is apparent that the
system has broken down in determining guilt, let alone sentencing
defendants to death."' One hundred twenty-three capital defendants
have been exonerated since 1973.35 Joshua Marquis, the district
attorney of Clatsop County, Oregon, responded that Gross's failure rate
8
in the criminal justice system is negligible.1
Recently, the Brookings Institute1 7 held a panel discussion of the
future of the death penalty, and Justice Scalia's concurrence was
discussed. Virginia E. Sloan, founder and president of Constitution

131. 543 U.S. at 568.
132. Id.
133. 126 S. Ct. at 2543 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Socher v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527
532 (1992)).
134. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerationsin the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (2005).
135. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE INNOCENCE LIST (2006), http://www.

deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?scid=6&did=110.
136. Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, 40 PROSECUTOR 40, 40 (2006).
137. The Brookings Institution, A Brookings Judicial Issues Forum: What Should Be
the Future of the Death Penalty? Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/
20060905-deathpenalty.pdf (last visited Fed. 14, 2006).
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Project, responded. to Justice Scalia with examples of people who had
been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death and called attention to
the lack of resources in exonerating people who have already been
executed because the resources necessarily have to be used to help those
who are still alive.138 Further, in 2003, then Illinois governor George
Ryan commuted the sentences of all 167 prisoners on Illinois's death row
following a two-year moratorium and the creation of a commission to
examine the death penalty in Illinois. 139 Kent Scheidegger, in support
of Justice Scalia, responded that innocent people who are sentenced to
die are more likely to be exonerated than those sentenced to life in
prison because the resources are channeled to those on death rowl'-a
problem in itself. The gravity of capital punishment necessitates
sacrificing helping non-death defendants who may be innocent due to the
shortage of resources. We do not know how many innocent people sit in
prison because they have no one to help them. The debate continues on
DNA and capital innocence, and the fact that a majority of the Court's
Justices got involved in the debate signals that a more serious look at
these issues and more critique of the capital guilt and sentencing
procedures are forthcoming.
ELIZABETH BRANDENBURG

138.
139.
(2002),
George
140.

Id. at 39-40.
See generally ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT
http'//state.il.us/defender/report.pdf (reporting the findings of Illinois Governor
Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment).
The Brookings Institution, supra note 137, at 40-41.

